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A well-ordered democratic system is effectively regulated
by a conception of justice. Through the role of principles of
justice, such a well-ordered polity can maintain its stability.
It can be assumed that persistence of a well-ordered
democratic system as a complex adaptive system required
as a necessary condition, the maintenance of the system's
essential Variables within certain limits.
Key words: Role of justice; well-ordered polity; complex
adaptive system; system's essential variables.
I. Introduction
Mankind has always argued about justice and injustice, while
social scientists and politicians have endlessly discussed the
conditions which make justice more or less attainable. Justice is
the most political or institutional of the virtues. The legitimacy of
a state rests upon its claim to uphold justice. In Rawls' words,
justice is the first virtue of social institutions, as truth is of
systems of thought. He assumes that a society is well-ordered
when it is not only designed to advance the good of its members
but when it is also effectively regulated by a public conception of
justice. That is, it is a society in which (1) everyone accepts and
knows that others accept the same principles of justice, and (2)
the basic social institutions generally satisfy and are generally
known to satisfy these principles (Rawls, 1971, p.ST.
However, existing societies are seldom well-ordered in this
sense, for what is just and unjust is usually in dispute. Men
disagree about which principles should define the basic terms of
their association. Yet it may still be said, despite this
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disagreement, that they each have a conception of justice. That
is, they understand the need for, and they are prepared to
affirm, a characteristic set of principles for assigning basic rights
and duties and for determining what they take to be the proper
distribution of the benefits and burdens of social cooperation.
In this paper, the principles of justice in a democratic system,
the regulative role of justice in a democratic system, and
adaptive mechanism of a well-ordered democratic system will be
discussed.
n. Principles of Justice in a Democratic System
According to Rawls, the conception of justice dictated by
collective rationality is specified by three lexically ordered
principles: greatest equal freedom, fair equality of opportunity,
and the difference principle, by which he means that any
inequality, including inequalities of freedom, in order to qualify
as just, must not merely advance but maximize the prospects of
the least advantaged. Rawls regards his difference principle not
only as an outcome of rational and prudential choice in the
original position, but also believes Its acceptance enables us to
transcend the "accidents of birth" and so constitutes our
recognition of everyone equally as a moral being.
From the theoretical viewpoint of rational morality, Rawls
suggests that the primary subject of the principles of social
justice is the basic structure of society, the arrangement of
major social institutions into one scheme of cooperation (1973,
p.54). He assumes that these principles are to govern the
assignment of rights and duties in these institutions and they
are to determine the appropriate distribution of the benefits and
burdens of social life. Further he argues that such a well-
ordered society is one in which some form of democracy eXists.
The role of justice in a democratic system is to set limits.
According to Fisk, every state attempts to realize a pattern of
justice. In assessing this claim, it is well to keep three things in
mind. First, the pattern of justice a state adopts will be one that
serves its needs for stability in relation to the pressures it faces.
If a state's justice is less strict than that of some other state, it
does not mean that there is no pattern of justice. Second, a
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state's patterns of justice is more than the pattern of practices of
its courts. Justice in the broad sense goes beyond the judiciary.
A state's pattern of justice will also include the administering of
distribution through executive agencies. Third, a pattern of
justice may disarm dissent without elimiating disatisfaction. So
a pattern of justice may be seen as grudging and narrow even by
those it makes governable (Fisk, 1989, p.s).
Pursuing justice is one side of a democratic system, but the
other side is supporting a social order with its component
economy. Of themselves, most economies place no limits on the
way they benefit the dominant group within them. There is then
a potential conflict between pursuing justice and supporting an
economy. This conflict is the basis for the numerous ways in
which the state is pulled in opposite directions. Through its
pursuit of justice, the system gains a normative dimension that
coexists uncomfortably with its economic functioning.
The normative dimension of the democratic system is a set of
obligatory limits on benefits and losses that adjust the various
parts of the society in the direction of cohesiveness. From
Aristotle came this idea that political stability is the reason the
state is linked with justice. It can be argued that a normative
dimension is not optional for states. A pattern of justice is
inherent in democratic systems since they need a mechanism of
stability and a ruling group to run them.
Within the modern liberal democratic system one aspect of the
overall conflict is the specific conflict between democracy and
capitalism. It is part of a pattern of justice because it limits loss
of control by the many and limits monopolizing control by the
few. The thrust toward more widely shared control encouraged
by democracy conflicts with the restricted control encouraged by
capitalism. The state's liberal function of promoting capitalism
and its democratic form fail to come together in a harmonious
institution. So long as democracy remains a widely accepted
condition for legitimate rule, this contradiction cannot be
eliminated. Of course, people can be dominated without
legitimate rule, but such an arrangement is likely to be unstable.
Since justice is a requirement of stable rule, there is no
guarantee in advance that the function for which ruling is
adopted will be compatible with justice. In different periods, the
specific character of the limits imposed by justice will vary (Fisk,
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p.50).
According to Barker the state exists not to centralize force or
to protect the economy but to promote the good life. He
understand the good life in terms of the capacities of citizens of
the state. The state exists to facilitate the fullest realization of
the capacities of all citizens. Justice plays a role in this process
since the state applies principles of justice in order to resolve
conflicts that would otherwise be an obstacle to full realization.
For Fisk, the state appears as an ensemble of institutions in
the sense of established associations with limited aims. Apart
from these institutiions the state has neither an economic
function nor a form of justice. Citizens should never be so
caught up in the relations of the state to the economy and its
responses to popular opposition that they begin to ignore the
fact that through its institutions the state is something in itself.
The underlying subject that functions to reproduce the economy
and whose behavior is restricted by justice is an ensemble of
authoritative institutions.
The importance of state institutions at this point is that they
combine the potentially conflicting form and function of the
state. The form of justice and the function of preserving the
economy are not disembodied features separate from one
another. They are embodied together in state institutions,
thereby introducing conflict within those institutions. The design
and behavior of these institutions is rarely a pure expression of
either form or function is are often a mix, not necessarily equal,
of both of these features.
Since these are institutions of political rule, they Will have
authority. They will, that is, speak, order, and act in the name of
the society as a whole rather than simply for a dominant group.
This authority of democratic institutions is not just an
institutional embodiment of the authority of classes, for the
system can have authority when no class is recognized as a
representative of the whole society. Nor is the authority of
democratic institutions a trasformation through those
institutions of the power of classes, since the system can retain
its authority even during periods when there is no class with an
assured dominance, economically, politically, or ideologically.
The form of justice and the function of preserving the economy
are then aspects of authoritative, concrete state institutions.
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In Fisk's words, once the state exists as just another set of
institutions, it has its distinctive institutional imperatives, one of
which is its need to be fed large quantities of money from a
prospering economy. Just as the need for revenue is internal to
the system functioning, so too is the need for justice internal to
the system functioning. Justice in a democratic system is an
institutional imperative. To empasize the need for justice, to the
exclusion of the system's functioning for the economy, would
leave it unclear why the system normally adopts only a minimal
justice. It can be argued that the internal need for justice comes,
not from ruling in the abstract, but from ruling to reproduce an
economy. Thus popular demands for a more radical justice run
up against this goal of ruling, showing thereby that ruling is no
more solely a matter of applying justice than it is solely a matter
of encouraging high state revenues.
In. Regulative Role of Justice in a Democratic System
In Rawls' theory of justice, it is assumed that a well-ordered
society is effectively regulated by a public conception of justice.
As Rawls argues, a set of principles of justice is to judge between
social arrangements that shape the division of advantages. Thus
the role of the principles of justice is to assign rights and duties
in the basic structure of society and to specify the manner in
which institutions are to influence the overall distribution of the
returns from social cooperation (Rawls, 1979, p.6). In other
words, the first problem of justice is to determine the principles,
to neglect inequalities, and to adjust the profound and long-
lasting effects of social, natural, and historical contingencies.
As Francis points out, regulation is often justified on the
grounds that it sets reasonable limits. It charts the middle
course between prohibiting an activity and leaving it unfettered.
Regulation is often sought to provide stability or equilibrium in
an area of endeavor that has experienced unsettling changes.
Fairness reinforces the concept of limits where there is some
measure of consensus concerning a range of acceptable
behavior. Regulatory solutions are less likely to be politically
acceptable when the issue at hand has polarized the political
community (Francis, 1993, p.ll).
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Public choice analysis regulates the way for a group to gain
income it would not otherwise enjoy if regulation did not exist. In
cases of politically contested compromise, regulation as limit
setting may have more impact on reducing an undesired activity
than an absolute prohibition would achieve. Regulations are
seen as justified when long-standing and widely shared
expectations within a community are no longer met (Francis,
1993, p.20).
In a sense, democracy embodies a pattern of justice. It limits
the power of the wealthy and hence of the state itself to exclude
the average citizen from political participation. This is indeed the
bright side of democracy. Nontheless, it is necessary to affirm
the critical perspective that democracy functions to channel all
forms for opposition into a form of participation that accepts the
underlying economic framework of the society. Thus conflict is
displaced into an institutional setting. This function is the dark
side of democracy.
One who advocates a form of radical justice cannot, however,
be an uncritical cheerleader for modern democratic institutions
in view of their dark side. Yet, in view of their bright side, those
who suffer from a lack of economic or political power can find
democratic institutions useful both immediately and in the long
run. Just how useful democracy can be to the exploited and
oppressed depends on its role in channeling opposition into
participation. It is, then, only with an awareness of the dark side
of democracy that the bright side can be evaluated (Fisk, p.167).
The dark side of democracy expresses how it functions for
reproducing the economy; its bright side expresses how it
functions in overcoming powerlessness. Yet the mere existence
of these functions is insufficient to imply that a democratic
system has a functional explanation. Democratic systems might
instead be explained by a functionality involving justice. If this
were the case, then not only would there be the functional fact
that a democratic system limits power but also, within the
stimulus cause, the dominant element would be the pressure for
limiting power. However, it can be said that a democratic system
is better explained functionally by appeal to its economic
usefulness rather than to its serving justice.
Though justice and a stable democracy are linked, people who
intend to realize one of these need not intend to realize the other.
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Members of an oppressed group might want to limit the powerful
without wanting a stable government, which could have the
oppsite effect of consolidating the power of the ruling class.
Democratic systems might be explained functionally by the fact
that they make governance possible. If this were the case, then a
democratic system would promote the system's stability, and the
dominant element in the stimulus cause would be pressure to
promote democracy for its stabilizing effects. Indeed, a
democratic system would promote stable rule through the fact
that by limiting power, a democratic system would be seen to be
ruling in the interests of all.
In democratic systems, there is pressure for limits on losses
and benefits, and the system is the dominant mechanism for
setting such limits and enforcing them. Such a system sets and
enforces limits not as a direct response to popular demands but
as a mediated one. Its economic function and the interest of the
ruling group modulate the response. But the crucial fact is that
the administration and enforcement of justice, in our broad
sense, require an ever larger state apparatus. Administration
becomes the most obvious face the system turns to the public.
The citizen's loss of power due to the rise of state administration
is an obstacle to justice. There is then the paradox that the
democratic system, in the process of implementing justice,
becomes a chief obstacle to its own justice.
This is true at least where effective restirctions on institutional
power embodying the idea of democracy are a part of the
system's justice. The democratic idea insists on wider forms of
participation, whether or not these forms become part of official
justice. So, more accurately, the paradox is that the modern
democratic system's implementation of justice is an obstacle
either to its own official justice or to a common form of radical
democratic justice.
IV. Adaptive Mechanism of a Well-Ordered Democratic
System
Based upon the two principles in view of the equality of the
members of a well-ordered society, Rawls argues that such a
society is one in which some form of democracy exists. It can
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now be assumed from a systems theoretical viewpoint that a
well-ordered democratic system is an organized complex system
in which the chracteristic structural and behavioral pattrerns
are primarily a result of the interactions among the members of
society. Through the role of the principles of justice, such a
system can maintain its stability, which we can simply refer to
as a complex adaptive system.
In systems theory, the system's main characteristic is its
functioning to maintain the given structure of the system within
preestablished limits. It involves feedback loops with its
environment, and possibly information as well as pure energy
interchanges, but these are geared principally to self-regulation
(structure maintenance) rather than adaptation (change of
systems structure). The complex adaptive systems are also open
and negentropic.
Such a perspective suggests that a prime requisite for the
persistence of a well-ordered democratic system is pattern
maintenance. We can say that persistence of a well-ordered
democratic system requires as a necessary condition the
maintenance of the system's essential variables within certain
limits (Buckley, 1967, p.498). It is assumed that a well-ordered
democratic system represents a kind of dynamic coherence
among the members that generates special properties. One such
property, feedback, is central to most social systems, making it
possible to learn and to regulate itself and thereby to provide for
self-maintenance and goal-oriented change. Easton suggests
that not only does feedback in a political system represent an
enormously complex set of relationships (Easton, 1990, p.258)
but that a democratic regime is expected to adopt feedback
systems that are more responsive than those in authoritarian
systems (Easton, 1990, p.259). True feeback control loops in a
well-ordered polity make possible not only self-regulation, but
self-direction or at least adaptation to a changing environment,
such that the polity may change or elaborate its structure as a
condition of survival or viability.
From systems viewpoint, it can be assumed that the essential
variables of a well-ordered democratic system are the principles
of justice, which are the necessary function for its maintenance.
Thus, in this regard, it must be understood how such a well-
ordered democratic system can persist by the principles of
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justice as the essential variables. From this systems theoretical
viewpoint, it can be assumed that a well-ordered democratic
system can develop its characteristic structural and behavioral
pattern by the essential variables. If a systems approach can be
adequately utilized, it is possible to analyze a well-ordered
democratic system as the complex adaptive system which may
operate toward good democratic polity by the principles of
justice. Now it is necessary to utilize both normative theory and
systems approach in order to develop a new theory of a well-
ordered polity.
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